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Comparative Corporate Governance – A Global Research Seminar

The Manner in which corporate law and financial regulations are made

A.

Introduction
Substantial differences exist in the systems of corporate law from an international per-

spective. There are different approaches concerning the law-making. Starting from possible reasons for the differences, this paper shall serve as a comparative analysis of the manner in which
corporate law is made in Germany as well as in the United States. In the light of the topic of this
seminar the focus of this paper will lay on corporate governance.
After a detailed representation of the law-making analysis in Germany, followed by that
of the United States, the third part will consist of a comparative analysis of both systems. For
analyzing the possible reasons for the differences in both jurisdictions, connections of legal history, legal theories and other backgrounds, as well as the roles of the different institutions and
guidelines are included. In the context of legal harmonization, the third part will also offer a determination of attempts for harmonizing the legal systems as well as a possible prospect for future developments and endeavors.
B.

The manner in which corporate law is made in Germany
In the course of the history until now German corporate law and the manner in which it

was made often changed and constantly developed. Like no other legal field, the development of
German jurisdiction can be illustrated by German corporate law, considering historical, political
and social aspects. For this reason, in order to classify and compare German corporate law, this
first part of the paper contains an analysis of German corporate law, starting in its very beginnings and coming to its most current expression, being the subject of corporate governance, while
passing all relevant steps in between. Reaching today’s time Corporate Governance shall be classified and analyzed in the light of globalization, Europeanisation, new challenges and influences.
In all those parts, special attention shall be given to the legal form and nature of corporate law.
Having set the scene of German corporate law, German corporate governance and the German
Corporate Governance code shall be classified, analyzed and legally classified in a national and
international context.
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I.

An introduction to German corporate law
One common definition of German corporate law states that corporate law covers the law

of associations under private law1 which are established for the purpose of reaching a certain
common goal through legal transaction.2 In the course of the time this definition became deceptive and questioned since companies with a sole shareholder are not associations but are, nevertheless, subjected to corporate law under certain circumstances.3 However, other definitions have
not been able to fully establish themselves.
Subject of German corporate law are various legal forms, which are ruled in different
laws. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereafter referred to as “BGB”)4 holds
provisions for the basic forms of associations (Vereine, section 21 et seqq. of the BGB) and corporations (Gesellschaften, section 705 et seqq. of the BGB). Further, the German Commercial
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, hereafter referred to as “HGB”)5 contains rules for partnerships (offene Handelsgesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “OHG”; section 105 et seqq. of the HGB),
limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “KG”; section 161 et
seqq. of the HGB) and other legal forms6 which are less relevant in this context.
Those legal forms of great practical importance are ruled by own laws which are exclusively created for the particular legal form. The most important ones for these are the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 (Aktiengesetz, hereafter referred to as “AktG”)7, providing laws for stock
companies (Aktiengesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “AG”), as well as the Act on Limited
Liability Companies (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, hereafter
referred to as “GmbHG”)8, containing the relevant laws for Limited Liability Companies (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, hereafter referred to as “GmbH”). This division, which is
common for European legislations, does not refer to the size of the company. 9 However, only
shares of a stock corporation can be listed and traded on the stock market. 10 For this reason stock

1

Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 II 1a).
Grunewald, 1-2; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 I; Klunzinger, Grundzüge des Gesellschaftsrechts, § 1 II.
3
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 II 1.
4
German Civil code as of 18 August 1896 (RGBl. I p. 195).
5
German Commercial Code as of 10 May 1897 (RGBl. I p. 219).
6
E.g. silent partnerships (stille Gesellschaften, section 230 et seq of the HGB) and shipping companies (Reedereien,
section 489 et seq of the HGB).
7
Stock Corporation Act as of 6 September 1965 (BGBl. I p. 1089).
8
Act on Limited Liability Companies as of 20 April 1892 (RGBl. I p. 477).
9
Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, 242; Baums/Birkenkaemper, CG, I.
10
Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, 242.
2
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corporations is rather the legal form to choose for large, publicly held firms with widely distributed ownership.11
II.

Historical development of German corporate law
The historical foundations and roots of German corporate law are not only academically

of interest, but also provide a better understanding for today’s corporate law in Germany as well
as legal comparisons and the Europeanization of corporate law.12
1.

The origins of German corporate law
The manner in which today’s corporate law is made is a product of the past two centuries

even though certain elements have their origin much earlier.13 Corporate law, as nearly all German laws, has been subject to wide array of influences from Roman law.14 However, even if certain structures resemble some of todays legal forms of corporations, there is an important structural difference being that all former expressions of legal forms of corporations were integrated in
a corporate-estates based social order which was concededly stable but far from flexible.15
2.

Corporate law in the time of German liberalism
The birth of modern corporate law in Germany was the transition from a corporate-

estates-based to a civil-liberal social order.16 The reorganization of the community order as well
as the incorporation of principles such as private autonomy, private property and freedom of trade
marked the end of the feudal system making every citizen a potential entrepreneur whose economic expansion should, from then on, only be regulated by the market itself and who should be
free to choose the legal form of a corporation.17 At this time, corporate law was still incorporated
in codified commercial law18 but opened to citizens of all social backgrounds. However, in this
period of time the old mentality of the estate-based order was still present, with the result that
German people still had strong conservative aversions towards extensive and liberal codes. 19

11

Baums/Birkenkaemper, CG, I.
Kraushaar, 275; detailed in Donald, 19-22.
13
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 I 1.
14
Cf. Kraushaar, 40; Mousourakis, 267.
15
Cf. Winkler, 235; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1.
16
Winkler, 234.
17
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1.
18
Public German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch), 1869.
19
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1.
12
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With the General German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch) of
1861 the first codification as known today was introduced. However, not until the turn of the century the complete codification of corporate law was completed.20 With the coming into force of
the HGB and the BGB the basic structures of legal forms such as the corporation, associations
and companies were set.
3.

The 20th century: dissociation from codification
Detailed codifications shaped the picture of corporate law in the beginning of the 20 th

century. Deep social transformations and historical happenings, such as the economic liberalism,
the resulting industrial revolution, the further resulting decay of the homogenous civil society and
the simultaneously developed grouping of people in the form of labor unions or the first forms of
associations, were the reason for many and fast changes of this time’s corporate law. 21 Another
product of these happenings was the ongoing nationalization of commercial policies.
However, already in the very beginning of the 19th century a movement away from complete codifications was noticeable and indicated the decay of the concept of full codifications. 22
More and more frequently, special laws were needed, that would not be incorporated in codes, as
for example the right of the GmbH. As there were needs of the society for a less complex and a
better-conditioned regulated corporation,23 the GmbHG was introduced in 1892 and captured a
new legal form without any historic or international example. Another example for the outdated
idea of extensive codes was the formation of the AktG. The extension of the regulation program
regarding the AG and its policies led to a duplication of the sections and thereby for the regulations concerning the AG to fall out of the HGB and to the formation of the AktG.24
However, not only the increased number of special laws led to the changing mentality
concerning codifications but also an increased number of above- and sub-statutory provisions that
replaced or stepped beside parliamentary laws.25 On the other side, cases in which legal regulations were complemented, modified and suppressed by case law as well as statuary and contract

20

Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 3.
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 1, § 2 III 3.
22
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 3.
23
Ulmer, in Ulmer/Habersack/Löbbe, A3; Westermann, in Scholz, introduction para. 43.
24
Schäfer/Jahntz, in Bayer/Habersack, 256; cf. Grundei/Zaumseil, in Grundei/Zaumseil, 18-19; cf. Schubert, in
Schubert/Hommelhoff, 1-4; Habersack, in MüKo AktG, Introduction para. 21.
25
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4.
21
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practices constantly grew.26 Especially the influence of further developments of law by judicial
decisions experienced constant growth in the course of time.27 The importance of those developments depended on the presence and the extent of adaptions by the governing law.
An example for this is the stock corporation law. Here, existing provisions are regularly
adapted to changed circumstances. Furthermore, there is comparatively rare processing in stock
corporation law, wherefore further developments of law by judicial decisions has little meaning.28
In other laws, such as the partnerships only little changes were made since the coming into force
of the codification. Instead, numerous principles and provisions were formulated by the Imperial
Court of Justice29 as well as the German Federal Supreme Court.30
In the course of this century, however, much more changed than the outer shape of corporate law. In prior times corporate law only had limited regulatory content and was mainly about
the legal relationship between the entrepreneurial company, the investment company and the
shareholder creditors and therefore mostly represented the interests of those groups. The legislator trusted in the self-regulation of those interests and provided legal forms to choose from as
well as nearly unlimited contractual possibilities.31 In the following era of single legislations an
opposite trend can be observed. Much more, corporate law aims at better general organizations of
corporations and thereby increases the importance of interests of other involved groups turning
corporate law more and more to mandatory law.32
These changes of the objective of corporate law – turning away from providing suitable
organizational structures for private associations, but increasingly to economic and rather distributional objectives – can be very well shown on AktG as of 1965.33 The provisions aim improvements of different aspects of corporate law such as improved publicity, more transparency
and more influence of the shareholders organized in the shareholder’s meeting on the profit appropriation. Further, the AktG shall protect investors and savers from bad investments and fraudster. On that point, generally, an increasing orientation of corporate law to concrete economic and

26

Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4.
Detailed in Fischer, 17.
28
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4c).
29
The imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht) was the supreme criminal and civil court oft he German empire from
1879 to 1945 based in Leipzig, Germany.
30
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4c).
31
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5.
32
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5.
33
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5b).
27
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sociopolitical purposes can be captured.34
Germany’s corporate law in the 20th century can be described as a catalogue of regulated
legal forms, that consisted of the sum of the laws regulating the individual legal forms. At that
time, problems arose when the existing mandatory law could not provide for the need of regulation with regard to provisions ruling hybrid forms of corporations. This need for provisions that
captured hybrid and flexible forms of corporation, to this time, indicated a call for impending
change in the legal appearance of German corporate law.
4.

Corporate law (on its way) in the 21st century
A new movement starting from the United States marked a new change in corporate law

in the 1990s. An extensive deregulation of corporate law led to the displacement or elimination of
mandatory law by dispositive rules that led to more flexibility and attractiveness for corporations.35
In the light of the the ongoing Internationalization of global businesses the rigid corset of
lengthy legislative processes did not seem to fit into the dynamic, global economy. A fasterworking and more flexible statutory framework was needed,36 wherefore the German lawmakers
were forced to react in order to be competitive.37 Therefore, the resulting loosening of the strict
structures of parts of German Corporate Law can be best explained by the internationally growing competitive pressure.38 Against this background, the significance of law as the central control
element in a democratic and constitutional state decreased.39
However, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the resulting financial crisis
the topic of executive compensation was amongst the most controversial topics about time. 40 The
fact that the very institutions and individuals that caused the collapse of the economy continue to
receive extraordinary salaries and benefits seems deeply unfair and the voices grew demanding
adjusted regulations concerning executive compensation, forcing regulators to react. 41 While in
many other countries endeavors were limited or hindered, Germany surprisingly took a leading

34

Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5 b).
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 1.
36
Möllers/Fekonja, 778
37
Cuervo-Cazurra/Aguilera, 430.
38
Mathieu, 579, 605; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 3; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 3.
39
Möllers/Fekonja, 779.
40
Achleitner/Rapp/Schaller/Wolff, ZCG 2010, pp. 113, 113-115.
41
Mathieu, 579, 582.
35
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position, taking concrete steps towards systematically changes of the structures of executive
compensation.42 It did so, however, extraordinarily quickly, yet productive and efficient.
With its Act on the Adequacy of the Management Board’s Compensation
(Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetz, hereafter referred to as “VorstAG”)43 Germany
encouraged companies to more efficient goal-setting and increased transparency being applicable
to all tradable stocks.44 The enacting of this law significantly contributed to improved corporate
governance structures and growing attention of shareholders and created a stir. With its VorstAG,
at the latest, German law making proved its competitiveness and that it is able to adjust to the
needs and interests of the society in short time.
III.

Europeanization of German corporate law
Having reached the 21st century, a new level of law-making arose and constantly grew in

terms of importance. Since the establishment of the European Union legislative approaches of the
European Commission were actively followed regarding the harmonization of national business
laws, to become internationally competitive as well as an attractive location for corporations.45
Other factors, such as various national corporate scandals and finally the financial crisis, also
produced reform efforts towards the Europeanization and harmonization of national business
laws.46
In this context, the European Court of Justice (Europäischer Gerichtshof, hereafter referred to as “EuGH”), played an ever growing role in harmonizing and setting the rules for a corporate legal system on European level.47 In particular, the jurisdictions of the EuGH concerning
the freedom of establishment, that no longer allow member states to prohibit or complicate the
usage of legal forms from jurisdictions of other member states are of relevance. 48 This matter
shall be presented in the following, illustrating the scope as well as the significance of the decisions of the EuGH for the member states.

42

Mathieu, 579, 583.
Act on the Adequacy of the Management Board’s Compensation as of 31 July 2009 (BGBl. I p. 2509).
44
Mathieu, 579, 583.
45
Mathieu, 579, 610; cf. Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 3.
46
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 4; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 1; Armour, ECGI No.
54/2005, 1.
47
Armour, ECGI No. 54/2005, 1.
48
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 4.
43
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1.

Daily Mail
Starting point of a series of decisions concerning principles of law in the context of free-

dom of establishment was the Daily Mail case49 in 1988.50 Daily Mail plc, a company registered
in England, intended to move its tax residence to the Netherlands 51 due to its more favourable tax
regimes, while keeping its company subject to British company law. This relocation under English law, required the consent of the British Treasury Department.52 The latter, however, refused
permission for the transfer of seat. Daily Mail argued that this refusal was in conflict with its
freedom of establishment53, referring the question to the EuGH.54 Applying a restrictive approach, the EuGH ruled that companies are “creatures of national law”55 and must comply with
the restrictions of its national law.56 Member states, therefore, could preclude national companies
from transfer their de facto head office.57
2.

Centros
Ten years later the EuGH revisited these ruling in Centros.58 A Danish couple established

Centros Ltd as an offshore company in the UK, in order to avoid the minimum capitalization requirement for Danish limited liability companies.59 However, the Danish commercial registry
refused Centros Ltd to register a branch in Denmark, arguing this to be an unlawful circumvention of the Danish minimum capitalization rules.60
The court held that it is unlawfully to deny a company’s status as a legal person, which
has been validly conferred by another jurisdiction, just because it has been conferred by another
jurisdiction.61 The court also held that the member states are prohibited from discriminating

49

Case 81/87, R v HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex p Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 27
September 1988; hereafter referred to as “Daily Mail“.
50
Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 7.
51
Daily Mail, para. 6.
52
Daily Mail, para. 5, 6; section 482 (1) (a) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970.
53
Daily Mail referred to its freedom of establishment as ruled in articles 52, 58 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, which is by now overruled by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(hereafter referred to as “TFEU“). The freedom of establishment as concerned in this context is now governed in
articles 49, 54 of the TFEU.
54
Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 8; Daily Mail, para. 8.
55
Daily Mail, para. 19.
56
Daily Mail, para. 19.
57
Daily Mail, para. 31.
58
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 9 March 1999; hereafter referred to as “Centros“.
59
Centros, paras. 2, 3, 18.
60
Centros, paras. 7, 12, 16.
61
Centros, para. 40; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9.
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against companies on the ground that they were formed under the law of another member state in
which it has its registered office but does not carry on any business 62 forcing the Danish authorities to recognize the legal status of Centros Ltd.
This decision caused a stir. To this time national corporate laws were not harmonized to
this extent, so that the possibility of an establishment of a company in other member states could
not be taken for granted.
3.

Überseering
Not until Überseering63 two years later, the significance of this overruling decision be-

came clear, where the EuGH went even further. A limited liability company validly formed under
Dutch law moved its head office to Dusseldorf, Germany. There, it filed a suit against a debtor
out of a work contract. However, the German courts refused to recognize the company’s existence, holding that the corporation did not have legal capacity to sue and be sued under German
law and dismissing the Dutch company from court proceedings in Germany.64
The EuGH overruled this decision by reference to Centros, after which the company’s status as such had been established by Dutch law, wherefore it was entitled to rely on freedom of
establishment and the other member state is required to recognize the company’s legal capacity.
4.

Inspire Art
After Centros, it was recognized, that branches of foreign companies with their head of-

fices in another state must be registered in that other state. Nevertheless, the member states tried
to equate those companies to their own companies. A law in the Netherlands ruled that their own
capital financing regulations should as well apply on foreign companies with their head offices in
the Netherlands.65 In this context the EuGH made another fundamental decision.
Inspire Art Ltd66, a company established under the laws of England and Wales,67 requested the registration of the company’s Dutch branch office at the commercial registry in the Nether-

62

Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9.
Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, 5 November 2002.
64
Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9.
65
Art. 4, 6 of the Law on Formally Foreign Companies as of 17 December 1997 (Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse
Vennootschappen, Staatsblad 1997 No 697, hereafter referred to as “WFBV“).
66
Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, 30 September 2003;
hereafter referred to as “Inspire Art”.
67
Inspire Art, para. 2, 34.
63
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lands.68 The registry intended to apply WFBV, containing specific Dutch rules for foreign entities
registered in the Netherlands. Under this law, Inspire Art Ltd would have been required, to use a
suffix indicating its foreign origin,69 and to comply with the minimum capital rules for Dutch
limited liability companies.70
The case ended up before the EuGH which, however, reiterated the points it has made in
its prior decisions in favor of freedom of establishment.71 The court ruled that it is contrary to the
provisions governing the freedom of establishment for national legislation “impose on the exercise of freedom of secondary establishment in that State by a company formed in accordance with
the law of another Member State certain conditions provided for in domestic company law in
respect of company formation relating to minimum capital and directors' liability. The reasons for
which the company was formed in that other Member State, and the fact that it carries on its activities exclusively or almost exclusively in the Member State of establishment, do not deprive it
of the right to invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the EC Treaty, save where the
existence of an abuse is established on a case-by-case basis.“ 72
5.

Range and meaning of the decisions of the EuGH
Germany, as most members of the European Union, has traditionally adhered to the “real

seat” theory, which implies that companies should be governed by the law in which its headquarters is located.73 After this theory a company can only chose another member’s corporate law if it
is willing to move its headquarters, which often outweighs the advantage of the more attractive
corporate law, in terms of the costs for the relocation.74 However, the EuGH overruled the real
seat theory by applying the “incorporation” theory.75 The incorporation theory looks to the law of
the place of the firm’s incorporation, meaning that entrepreneurs can simply incorporate their
business in the jurisdiction of their choice and are free to choose the corporate law of their
choice.76
With its decisions the EuGH, finally and unambiguously made clear, that the freedom of
68

Inspire Art, para. 36.
Inspire Art. Para. 36; Art. 2 WFBV.
70
Inspire Art, para. 23; Art. 2-5 WFBV.
71
Inspire Art. paras. 91, 94, 98, 120, 135.
72
Inspire Art, para. 144.2.
73
Dammann, Fordham 2003, 607, 611; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 6.
74
Dammann, Fordham 2003, 607, 611.
75
Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI 127/2009, 1 f.
76
Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI 127/2009, 2.
69
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establishment demands that a corporation that was effectively founded in a member state of the
European Union should be recognized as such in all other member states in which it settles.77
European entrepreneurs are now free to choose a governing law of their choice among the member states,78 what practically means that the EuGH overruled member states’ national laws in favour of European entrepreneurship.79
The EuGH concretized and confirmed its rulings around the freedom of establishment,80
however, the cases of Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art sufficiently illustrate the scope of the
increasing importance of the EuGH and the consequences of its overruling for the member states.
6.

Further endeavors towards Europeanization: Societas Europaea
Moreover, further steps were taken towards increased harmonization, flexibility and mo-

bility of companies in Europe.81 Since October 2004, listed companies have the choice to choose
not only between competing corporate laws of the member states, but also can choose the law of
the European Company (Societas Europaea, hereafter referred to as “SE”).82 A SE is a legal form
for a European stock company that is entirely ruled by a standardized law of the European Union.83
Legal foundation of a SE is on the one hand the Regulation 2157/2001 of the European
Council84 and the council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001. The SE regulation is both,
binding law as well as tied into national law with individual national legislation of the member
states governing how the gaps in the supranational framework are supposed to be filled in. 85
Germany has implemented the directives into their corporate law by way of the European Company Implementation Act.86
77

Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 18 I 4d).
Zimmer, NJW 2003, 3585, 3585, 3587.
79
Cf. Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 5.
80
Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc vs Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 12 September 2006; Case C210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 16 December 2008.
81
Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 1; Theisen/Wenz, in EG, A II 3.
82
Council Regulation of the European commission No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE),
effective since 8 October 2004; Braendle/Noll, SE, 1,4; Herdegen, §14 III; Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI
127/2009, 1-3.
83
Herdegen, §14 III.
84
Council regulation 2157/2001 as of 8 October 2001 on the statute for a European company (SE); SE Regulation
and council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard
to the involvement of employees.
85
Braendle/Noll, SE, 1, 4.
86
European Company Implementation Act as of 22 December 2004 (Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen Gesellschaft) (BGBl. I, p. 3675).
78

11

Comparative Corporate Governance – A Global Research Seminar
IV.

Corporate Governance in Germany
Germany got into the “corporate governance game”87 comparatively late. However, at the

latest, since the implementation of the German Corporate Governance Code the topic is all
around and highly controversial discussed.88 The further focus of this part shall therefore lay on
corporate governance since it uniquely illustrates the development of the manner in which corporate law is made and the adaption of German corporate law to the ongoing internationalization
and Europeanization.
There are uncountable reputed definitions of the term corporate governance,89 that all involve the organization, management and control of companies as well as the functionality of the
management and control bodies of the company and the control of its behavior, either through
external mechanisms or through internal provisions of its corporate constitution.90 Corporate
governance ultimately aims globally recognized standards for good and thoroughly leadership
and supervision of companies,91 in order to improve the company’s efficiency and to increase
shareholder value.92 Corporate Governance can therefore be best described as the sum of all legal
and actual rules and provisions for the leadership and the supervision of (noted) companies.93
Various media-effective acquisitions, management issues and company crises moved the
topic into general awareness.94 Cases, in which the board of an AG could practice bad speculations, mismanagement or deceitful actions that only came to light when creditors, business partners and shareholders suffered damages running into millions and thousands of employees lost
their jobs.95 Moreover, the financial crisis brought further failures to light. 96 Nevertheless, corporate governance is more than mere weak point analysis, aiming to prevent described crises.97 The
discussion about corporate governance also entails a fundamental rethinking of general concerns
of the capital markets on, such as transparency and management principles, on an international
87

Mathieu, 579, 604.
Hopt, ECGI 170/2011, 1; Vetter, DNotZ 2003, 748, 748; Grundei/Zaumseil, in Grundsei/Zaumseil, 17.
89
Hopt, ECGI 170/2011, 6.
90
Vetter, DNotZ 2003, 748, 748; Hopt, ECGI 170/2011, 8.
91
Lutter, in Handbuch Coporate Governance, 124; Seibert, in Festschrift für Peter Hommelhoff, 1111, 1111.
92
Vetter, DNotZ 2003, 748, 748, 750
93
Seibert, in Festschrift für Peter Hommelhoff, 1111, 1111.
94
Feddersen/Hommelhoff/Schneider, in Feddersen/Hommelhoff/Schneider, 4 f.; Seibert, in Festschrift für Peter
Hommelhoff, 1111, 1111, 1114; with examples: Becht/Bolton/Roell, ECGI No. 02/2002, 841.
95
Eisenhardt/Wackerbarth, para. 552; Feddersen/Hommelhoff/Schneider, in Feddersen/Hommelhoff/Schneider, 4 f.;
Vetter, DNotZ 2003, 748, 748-749.
96
Hopt, ECGI 170/2011, 5.
97
Vetter, DNotZ 2003, 748, 749.
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level, increasing the competitive aspect of the economy, resulting in the shareholder to be enabled to be more selective.98
In this context, the history of Germany plays an important role shaping corporate law
through its specific needs after both world wars. For a long time, the main focus of German
economy was the rapid reconstruction of the industries and the economy. In these times only few
investors invested in stocks. In need of other forms of financing, companies focused mainly on
bank loans, wherefore shareholder played a comparatively minor role. 99 With the stabilization
and resurrection of the German economy and the entrance into the international competition this
changed, so that German companies were then faced with big competitors.100
Against this background, the idea over a public and easily accessible corporate governance code, as known of other jurisdictions, arose, that should help eliminating competitive disadvantages

of German companies, marketing German companies101 to foreign investors and

providing those with an overview of the German corporate governance model and the German
corporate constitution.102
1.

“Legal” basis: The German Corporate Governance Code
On 26 February 2002 the German governmental commission named “Deutscher Corpo-

rate Governance Kodex”, that was appointed by the Federal Government, decided the code of the
same name and handed it over to the Federal Minister of Justice.103 Meanwhile the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, hereafter referred to as
“DCGK”)104 already has been published in the electronic Federal Gazette105 and has been supplemented and amended several times.106
Before, two private initiatives developed codes and principles that were then replaced by
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the DCGK.107 However, the decisive impulses were international ones, being the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 1999 and the English “Combined Code of Best Practice” of
1998108 serving as precursors.109
The DCGK introduced recommendations for standards of conduct for the management
boards and the supervisory boards of listed company.110 It consists of a summary of legal provisions concerning the management and supervision of companies. Furthermore, the DCGK recommends compliance with rules and provisions that are aimed to prevent the weaknesses of the
corporate constitution in Germany, such as the lacking transparency of German management and
the limited orientation of the interests of shareholders.111
2.

Section 161 of the AktG
The governmental commission not only worked out the code itself, but also proposed,

what nowadays is held by section 161 of the AktG. The idea is to link the code to an obligation to
publish a declaration of conformity112 demanding the managing and the supervisory board of
listed companies to declare annually whether or not the recommendations of the DCGK were
followed.113 This declarations need to be permanently available to the shareholders, 114 which is
supposed to create pressure in order to further encourage compliance with the provisions of the
DCGK.115
3.

Structure of the DCGK
The provisions of the DCGK are divided in three categories. In accordance with its mis-

sion to inform about the existing law, half of the DCGK is a reproduction and description of the
law.116 Another large part are recommendations marked with the word “shall”, meaning that
companies can deviate but are, however, obliged to “comply or explain” according to section 161
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of the AktG.117 Finally, the DCGK contains suggestions indicated by the word “should”, being in
no way legally binding but suggested to ensure good corporate governance.118
4.

Legal nature of the DCGK or “comply or explain”
Although the DCGK came into force more than ten years ago the classification from a le-

gal-dogmatic perspective still turns out to be complex.119 The code, as a summary of mere recommendations, is technically not binding, yet has a legal basis. The DCGK attains normative
force through section 161 of the AktG,120 a legally binding provision of a parliamentary legislative proceeding. The code itself was, however, worked out by a governmental commission and
therefore did not pass a legislative parliamentary procedure.121
The wording as well as its legal presentation further illustrate the self-conception of the
code being not legally binding.122 The law explicitly allows companies to explain that they chose
to opt-out certain provisions or the whole code.123 Following the British model this phenomenon
is captured by the concise formulation of “comply or explain”124, which might be, however, deceptive, since the companies are not asked to explain, but to merely state if they complied with
the code or not.125 Yet, No. 3.10 of the Code itself recommends to explain potential deviations
from the code, so that the formulation “comply or explain” also fits the German model.
The code does not fit in the traditional German system of legal sources,126 wherefore the
classifying of the code turns out to be difficult, especially in terms of enforcement. 127 Often, the
DCGK will be referred to as “soft law”128 since the provisions of the code can voluntarily be
called in and non-compliance cannot be legally punished.129 However, the fact that the provisions
of the DCGK are legally non-binding rather implicates that the provisions cannot be described as
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any kind of legally binding law,130 wherefore the regular division of soft and hard law does not
provide any help.
Further, the German Corporate Governance Code is no trade usage in the sense of section
346 of the HGB,131 since it misses a common and voluntary practice. 132 It is also is not captured
by customary law since the legislatively granted possibility of voluntary adoption would conflict
the legislator’s intention to not be legally binding by customary law. 133 Finally, an introduced
doctrine of secondary sources of law attempts to describe the binding effect of rules created by
private entities such as the DCGK,134 but, however, misjudges the factual, economic forces effecting companies in acting, being the market itself and the intent to compete.
The binding effect of the legally non-binding DCGK can be explained by the market pressure.

135

Especially the case of Germany, which was originally shy towards corporate governance

standards, serves as a good example to illustrate to which extent the market pressure drills jurisdictions out of their own national legal tradition towards market-resist solutions.136 Furthermore,
the companies act out of the fear to be punished by the market, since the declarations need to be
made public and investors might prefer companies complying with the rules rather than not, making self-interest and the intent to not lose the trust of investors another factor of the indirectly
binding effect of the code.137
In this context the financial press also plays an important role. 138 Not compliance can naturally become a discussed topic, so that the companies might also act out of the fear to be legally
sanctioned by losing their reputation through non-compliance.139 Summing up, compliance with
the code is voluntarily, however there is an indirect operating duty to comply. 140 Since this duty
is of no legal nature, the force acts on the grounds of self-regulation and market pressure.141
Concluding on the legal nature of the code, it does not appear surprising in light of German law130
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making history that a code, worked out by a governmental commission, consisting of a summary
of recommendations by a non-legislative institution, operating in the way of self-regulation, will
be subject to criticism and incomprehension.142 However, the “legal” form of the DCGK proved,
as especially the larger companies rather intended to comply than to risk being punished by the
market, wherefore the concept of self-regulation was successful.143 Furthermore, since the code
does not have to pass legislative instances, flexibility in which the code can react to market happenings is a central advantage.144 Summing up, the code constitutes an interesting approach of a
new phenomenon lying somewhere between self-regulation and regulation by law.145
5.

The DCGK under German constitutional law
After all, the legal nature of the DCGK is problematic under German constitutional

law.146 Main points of criticism in academia and literature were the doubted constitutional conformity of the code as well as the lacking parliamentary involvement.147 In particular, the authorship of the code can be subject to criticism in light of democratic legitimacy. 148 According to article 20 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz)149 all state power
emanates from the people. In case the code should be classified by public law it would be subject
to democratic legitimacy.150 Prerequisites for this would be adequate standards on factual and
personal legitimacy. This standard is provided by the provision of section 161 of the AktG,
wherefore the argument against the democratic legitimacy of the DCGK can be easily levered.151
The same applies for the argument concerning the parliamentary involvement, since section 161
of the AktG passed the regular legislative rule-making process, wherefore the interaction of the
code and section 161 of the AktG invalidate most points of constitutional criticism.152
V.

Conclusion
The manner in which corporate law is made in Germany has been a product and affected
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by its history. For this reason and for a better understanding of the German legal tradition in regard of codifications and other particularities, the most important steps of history were shown. As
much as the attitude of German corporate law towards codifications changed back and forth in
the course of time, today’s flexibility and adaptability of German law-making as shown on the
VorstAG was unequalled on this level. Bearing in mind, that Germany had to catch up with its
international competition with years behind, because of its historical background, the VorstAG
shows that Germany finally caught up and plays with the international competition on a high level, setting new standards and maybe even handling the resulting situation of the financial crisis
more efficient than other countries.
Furthermore, an expression of today’s manner in which corporate law is made is the
DCGK. The DCGK, as well, greatly contributed to the competitiveness of Germany on an international comparison. Before the adoption of the code, foreign investors experienced fears of contacts to German corporate law being faced with a comparatively small capital market, no comparable supervisory institutions as the SEC, 400 sections in the decisive law and a foreign language.153
Even if the legal nature of the code is subject to controversial discussions, the code stood
the test and performed its task to inform foreign investors about German corporate law and thereby create pressure for the companies to comply and to attract investors in a process of not law but
the self-regulation of the market.154
Looking ahead, a way back to codifications and more nationally orientated laws seems
unlikely. The trend is towards a harmonized law on a European level with the EuGH setting the
tone as it did with its decisions regarding the freedom of establishment.

153
154

Lutter, in Handbuch Corporate Governance, 125.
Müller-Michaels, in Grundei/Zaumseil, 61.

18

Comparative Corporate Governance – A Global Research Seminar
C.

United States
In order to research on the topic of the manner in which corporate law and financial regu-

lation are made, three methodologies have applied, which are: First, the legal theories of corporate law and financial regulation. Second, the development through the historical perspective of
them and finally, the comparative law method which is going to be applied in the comparative
part of this research paper. Since this topic is very broad, researcher decided to focus mainly on
corporate governance related matters. As a result, this research paper will wholly illustrate and
discuss on the U.S. law and related financial regulations in regarding to the U.S. corporate governance which can briefly define as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”.155
I.

The U.S. Corporate Governance Structure
The U.S. corporate law has a distinct attribute as every state has its own basic corporate

statues, while federal law creates minimum standards for trade in company shares and governance rights for publicly traded corporation. The U.S. Constitution was interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court to allow corporations to incorporate in the state of their choice, regardless of
where their headquarters are.156 Therefore, regarding to the realm of corporate law and financial
regulation, there are two main sources of corporate governance in the U.S. which are state law
and federal statue.
1.

State Law
In the U.S., the term “corporation” generally refers to incorporated business entities, or

entities chartered under the laws of a particular state. The corporate law of a state where a corporation was incorporated generally governs that corporation. Despite some attempts to unify corporate law in the U.S. (e.g. the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, which was adopted by
many states)157, the corporate laws of various states differ. Therefore, some states, notably Delaware has become almost a brand name for the “business” of serving as the official home for cor-
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porations (especially American public corporation)158 since: First, the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) is one of the most advanced and flexible corporation statutes in the nation.
Second, the Delaware courts are highly respected for corporation suits, both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court. Third, the state legislature takes seriously its role in keeping the corporation statute and other business laws current. Finally, the DGCL is, in a sense, have
been using as a model corporate law in other jurisdictions. Hence, when this research paper mentions about state law, it shall refer to DGCL.
To be concise, business entities in the USA may take the form of a sole proprietorship,
partnerships (general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership and limited
liability limited partnership), a limited liability company (LLC), and corporation (private and
public) including S corporation and C corporation which are subject to different taxation rules.
However, we will focus solely on corporation which in particular contains five characteristics;
legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, centralized management under a board
structure, and shared ownership by contributors of capital.159
(1) Legal personality
One can create a corporation by filing a document called the article of incorporation with
the appropriate government office of the chosen state of incorporation, then the state will announce the existence of the corporation160. By permitting the corporation to serve as a single contracting party that is distinct from the various individuals who own or manage the firm. It enhances the ability of these individuals to engage together in joint projects. The core function of
this separate personality has been termed ‘entity shielding,’ to separate the assets of the corporation from the corporation’s owners.
(2) Limited liability
The creditors are limited to making claims against assets that are held in the name of the
corporation itself, and have no claim against assets that the firm’s shareholders hold in their own
names. It protects the assets of the firm’s owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors and shifts
downside business risk from shareholders to creditors. This makes creditors as monitors of the
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firm’s managers, a task which they may be in a better position to perform than are the shareholders in a firm in which share ownership is widely dispersed.
(3) Transferable shares
Transferability permits the firm to conduct business uninterruptedly as the identity of its
owners changes and in turn enhances the liquidity of shareholders’ interests and makes it easier
for shareholders to construct and maintain diversified investment portfolios.
(4) Centralized management under a board structure
Corporate law typically vests principal authority over corporate affairs in a board of directors or similar committee organ that is periodically elected, exclusively or primarily, by the firm’s
shareholders. Corporations are distinguished by a governance structure in which all but the most
fundamental decisions are delegated to a board of directors.
(5) Shared ownership by contributors of capital
Investors of the corporation have two rights which are the right to control the firm, and
the right to receive the firm’s net earnings. More specifically, investors have the right to participate in control which generally involves voting in the election of directors and voting to approve
major transactions and the right to receive the firm’s residual earnings, or profits that typically
proportional to the amount of capital contributed to the firm.
The basic rights of shareholders relative to directors in the corporate entity have been determined in the state law level, as federal law has not supplanted the shareholder-director relationship as determined by the states.161 Under corporate law in all states, directors manage the
business and affairs of the corporation. Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote, sell,
or litigate.
To start with voting, shareholders’ voting right is a key part of corporate law, but that
does not mean that shareholders can vote on every issue. Most business decisions are left entirely
to the board of directors or those to whom they delegate such authority. Shareholders participate
only infrequently in a limited set of decisions, including the election of directors, fundamental
corporate changes, and ratification. In details as follows:
(1) Election of directors: Directors are usually elected annually, but this pattern can be
varied by the corporation’s articles of incorporation or other private ordering. Shareholders also
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have the power to remove directors in some circumstances. Under DGCL, staggered board (classified board) is very popular among U.S. corporations162, A company with a staggered board
groups directors into classes (typically three), with each class elected by shareholders at successive annual meetings. Together with poison pills that consist of stock warrants or rights that allow
the holder to buy an acquirer’s stock (a so-called “flip over” provision), or the target’s stock (a
“flip in” provision), or both, at a substantial discount from the market price. They provide antitakeover protection both by forcing any hostile bidder, no matter when it emerges, to wait at least
one year to gain control of the board and requiring such a bidder to win two elections far apart in
time rather than a one-time referendum on its offer.
(2) Fundamental corporate changes: Mergers and similar transactions require the approval
of shareholders as well as directors and, thus, are an exception to the usual rule that leaves corporate decisions entirely in the hands of the directors. In many cases, the directors act as gatekeepers: The shareholders can vote only on those transactions that are recommended to them by the
directors.
(3) Ratification: Shareholders occasionally vote on the ratification of self-dealing transactions by interested directors. The vote can cleanse the transaction of any taint or shift the burden
of proof in a legal challenge.
Secondly, Selling, the ability to sell one’s shares is a core right for shareholders and one
that corporate law has, for the most part, left to the market. Appraisal right is a rare exception
where corporate law guarantees shareholders the right to sell their shares.163
Thirdly, litigating, in addition to voting and selling, a shareholder’s ability to sue serves
as a constraint on the actions of managers and is a regular part of the governance foundation. Litigation rights of shareholders include derivative suits, direct suits and class actions, and inspection and other ancillary rights.164
(1) Derivative suits: In particular circumstances, such as breaches of fiduciary duty by
those in control of the corporation, DGCL permits a shareholder to bring a suit in the name of,
and on behalf of, the corporate entity. This type of suit is an exception to the usual rule that direc162
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tors act for the corporation. It occurs when directors are disabled by conflict or are otherwise unable to meet their fiduciary duty.
(2) Direct suits and class actions: Shareholders can also bring direct suits, which may be
class actions if numerous shareholders are affected by common questions. In contrast to derivative suits, in which the loss to the shareholder is derivative of the harm to the collective enterprise, direct suits may be brought for an injury that the shareholder feels individually, such as
deprivation of a right to vote or a contract right.
(3) Inspection and other ancillary rights: Shareholders also have ancillary rights at state
law, such as the right to inspect the books and records of the corporation, including the list of
shareholders. Such inspection may be the first salvo in a litigation battle, an effort to sell shares,
or a voting campaign.
On the other hand, the U.S. courts and state legislators have developed a robust fiduciary
standard through time to set standards for board of directors of the company to use their managerial discretion for utmost shareholders’ value. Corporate director’s fiduciary duties generally fall
into two principle categories. These are the duties of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of
loyalty requires that corporate fiduciaries duty exercises their authority in a good faith attempt to
advance corporate purposes. In particular, it bars directors from competing with corporation; appropriating its property, information, or business opportunities; and especially from transacting
business with it on unfair terms. By contrast, the duty of care reaches every aspect of a director’s
conduct. It requires director to act with “the care of an ordinarily prudent person in the same or
similar circumstances.” By the way, the key for applying and adjusting these concepts by court is
the “business judgement rule.”165
2.

The Idea behind State Law
In the U.S., corporation is developed to serve as a tool to increase shareholders welfare or

in other words, it maximizes the size of the economic pie for stockholders. On the other hand,
corporate law enables entrepreneurs to transact easily through the medium of the corporate entity,
and thus lowers the costs of conducting business. Corporate law in the U.S. has long been
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evolved under the influence of a relationship between shareholders and director.166 The long battle between the conservative, private, shareholder-wealth-maximization school of corporate legal
thought and the progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility school is now
over.167 The victor, it is claimed, is the conservative school, also known as the “nexus-ofcontracts” approach168, which holds that corporations should be run for the exclusive benefit of
shareholders (“shareholder primacy”).169 This is the backbone principle of the U.S. corporate law
leads us to the current idea of the U.S. corporate governance. In order to invigorate the mentioned
idea, as a common law jurisdiction, the most appropriate way is to start with a prominent case of
the topic which for this study is the “Dodge v. Ford Motor Company”170 case.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company
This case, ruled by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1919, indicates that the corporation
have to operate in the interests of its shareholders, rather than in a charitable manner for the benefit of its employees or customers. It is often cited as affirming the principle of "shareholder primacy" in the US corporate law. On the other hand, the case also affirmed the business judgment
rule, leaving director an extremely wide discretion about how to run the business. The case can
be briefed as follow.
The shareholder made their complaint and demand for further dividends after the Ford
Motor Company had concluded its most prosperous year of business but declared no special dividend during the business year. It had been the practice for the company, under similar circumstances, to declare larger dividends. It had been the policy of the corporation for a considerable
time to annually reduce the selling price of cars, while keeping up, or improving, their quality.
The plan is not intended to produce immediately a more profitable business, but a less profitable
one; not only less profitable than formerly, but less profitable than it is admitted it might be
made. The apparent immediate effect will be to diminish the value of shares and the returns to
shareholders. Instead, Henry Ford’s ambition is to still employ more men, to spread the benefits
of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and
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their homes. In order to do this the company needed to pay sixty per cent of its capitalization to
reinvest for the growth of the company. As a result, no dividends other than the regular dividends
had been paid. The Court held that Henry Ford could not lower consumer prices and raise employee salaries. In its opinion, the discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to the reduction of profits or the non-distribution of
profits among stockholders in order to benefit the public. Because this company was in business
for profit, it could not be turned into a charity. This case turned finally upon the point, the question, whether it appears that the directors were not acting for the best interests of the corporation.
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders and
the powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes. There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to
be exercised in good faith.
Combining all the information above together, they not only made the corporation
uniquely attractive for organizing productive activity but also generate tensions and tradeoffs that
lend a distinctively corporate character to the agency problems that corporate governance must
address.171 It is undeniable that the agency problem is one of the most essential and all-time discussed problem in the U.S. Possibility of conflict between shareholders and director has long
been with us and will continue to be so long as business activity is conducted through the corporate form. Corporate governance now provides a tested and familiar nomenclature for addressing
the issues involved, and a substitute analytical paradigm has yet to emerge. Then the most powerful protection against wrongdoing or simple misdirection of corporate asset is a good corporate
governance and, in the U.S., they emerge from best practices that are accepted in the marketplace.172
3.

Federal Statute
There has been superimposed upon state corporation law a vitally important and constant-

ly expanding area of regulation consisting of the federal securities acts and their rules and regula171
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tions (the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by
laws like the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 and the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010). In this connection, major attention
has been focused on federal securities regulation. This aspect of "federal corporation law"173
looms large on the current corporate scene. The approach of the federal securities laws has not
been to define or create the internal corporate relationship between directors and shareholders,
but to make that relationship better for shareholders or investors.174 For federal securities laws,
usually has been defined through greater disclosure requirements for publicly traded corporations. In addition, it has also been developed through the attempt to prevent future uproar against
systemic loopholes and financial crises. Accordingly, the historical facts suggest a much more
piecemeal evolution.175 Then the best way to explain the distinction of the U.S. corporate governance is to display by historical perspective and fulfill with the external factors behind those
changes.
a) Managerial Capitalism Era
Between 1960s and 1970s, it was a decade characterized by strong managers and weak
owners,176 as corporate law tended to increasing flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for
shareholders. Corporate ownership became dispersed and the separation of ownership and control
was seen as giving power to managers and resulting in what came to be called agency problems.177 Individuals rarely were actively engaged in corporate governance and shareholder activism achieved little influence.178 During this period the U.S. corporate law is a matter of state rather than federal regulation. Only securities law is regulated at the federal level, and the emphasis
of the SEC is usually on disclosure rather than substantive provisions regarding company struc-
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ture179. Many investor rights are essentially vested with the board, companies have great latitude
in shaping the structure and powers of boards in practice. The federal nature of corporate law laid
the foundations for managerialism within U.S. corporate governance, since shareholders rights
remained relatively weak under this competitive structure. Corporate boards were predominately
made up of insiders, chosen from company executives and former executives, or friends of the
executives.180 These directors had a largely advisory role, and would rarely overturn or even
mount major challenge to executives’ decision. Meanwhile, shareholders had little direct say on
the election of board members, since legal rules required them to go through an expensive process of proxy voting rather than having direct access to propose candidates.181 After this, the SEC
began requiring disclosure of the existence of an audit committee and published guidelines about
the activities of audit committees. Meanwhile, no regulations existed regarding compensation
committees. Executive remuneration consisted mostly of fixed salaries and bonuses tied to annual
performance of the company. Salaries were strongly correlated to the size of company revenues,
and remained relatively insensitive to corporate performance or long-term value creation.182
Although the U.S. has never developed a stakeholder model of corporate governance,
managerial capitalism did allow scope for certain elements of quasi-stakeholder orientation.183
Firms developed paternalistic forms of ‘welfare capitalism’ characterized by stable employment
and large internal labor markets, particularly for white-collar employees.184 However, the U.S.
law enshrined a strict distinction between firm governance and contractual bargaining relationships with employees, who were seen as external to the corporation and restricted the scope of
collective bargaining in ways that protected managerial prerogative. Nonetheless, labor union
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strength and commitments to core employees exerted some check on managerial authority and
retained some significance in managerial decision making during this period.185
b) Investor Capitalism Era
During the 1980s, the power of managers was challenged by a variety of new developments. Power began to shift substantially toward investors due to the rise of new types of institutional investors and the advent of hostile takeovers. Institutional investors emerged as an important new category of shareholder. Institutional investors had diversified portfolios and became
much more active players in corporate governance, using their growing blocks to exercise greater
voice in corporate management.186 Most strikingly, a wave of hostile takeovers threatened the
dominance of U.S. managers. The diversified conglomerates of the past decades proved to be
undervalued in the stock market by the emerging institutional investors, as an aftermath, diversified firms were taken over at high rates.187 Parallel to these changes, the role of the board also
underwent a critical examination. As the rapid increase in the proportion of independent directors
and a growing number of outside directors were appointed at this period, but executives still retained almost complete control over the actual selection process. Executives continued to see
directors nominated by shareholders as lacking independence and representing the particular interests of a shareholder group.188
By the way, the growing attention to stock prices and ‘shareholder value’ also placed executive pay under growing scrutiny, and shifted attention to strengthening links between pay and
company performance. A key development here was the introduction of share options and other
equity-based incentives. Equity-based incentives were also used to reward managers under leveraged buy-out schemes. Finally, to weaken their resistance to hostile bids, managers were offered
‘golden parachutes’ that awarded bonuses to those managers who lost their jobs in association
with changes in corporate control.189 However, shareholders have no direct ‘say on pay’ under
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corporate law, hence leaving it to the board to influence the size and form of managerial pay
schemes.
c) Executive Defense and the Ideology of Shareholder Value Era
In 1990s, the trend toward greater shareholder influence continued, but was reshaped by
the responses of managers. On one hand, executives sought to defend their own power by shielding firms from unwanted takeover bids. On the other hand, managers aligned themselves increasingly with the interests of shareholders through new forms of executive pay and adopting the ideology of shareholder value. Shareholder value refers to the concept that the primary goal for a
company is to increase the wealth of its shareholders by paying dividends and/or causing the
stock price to increase. Somewhat paradoxically, although shareholder power was tamed, shareholder value became a powerful new ideology.190 In terms of share ownership, institutional investors not only grew in size, but gradually began voting more actively against takeover defenses
proposed by management and even supported initiatives to remove such defenses.191 Besides,
federal proxy rules were revised to give shareholders enhanced latitude to communicate amongst
themselves. Then, the scope of issues targeted by shareholder activism expanded further to cover
changes in board structure and function, as well as executive and director compensation.192
By the early 1990s, the proportion of independent directors has increased among the public firms. Meanwhile, this trend slowly spread to smaller firms. Despite the growing importance
of independence, two facts are worth noting. First, the legal definition of an independent director
remained rather weakly developed and was specified only in state corporation law. Second, a
majority of U.S. firms still combined the role of CEO and chairman within the board. This fact
puts some doubt on the genuine independence of other board members.193 In particular, the rise of
equity-based pay such as stock options had given managers a greater stake in promoting restructuring and orientating their strategies toward the stock market. In addition, the SEC had changed
the rule, making possible for executives to exercise stock options and sell their stocks at the same
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time, thereby exploiting very short-term movements in stock prices to their own advantage.194
The 1990s was the decade in which senior executive compensation shifted from being primarily
cash-based to being primarily stock-based. With this change, management became focused not
simply on the relationship between market price and break-up value (which the advent of the
bust-up takeover compelled them to watch), but on the likely future performance of their firm’s
stock over the short-term. Far more than the hostile takeover, equity compensation induced management to obsess over their firm’s day-to-day share price.195 As a result, the new forms of executive pay, greater executive turnover, and golden parachutes, shifted managerial interests away
from the long-term development of the firm, and linked their own interests with shareholder value.196
d) The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (The Sarbanes–Oxley Act)
By the early 2000s, the U.S. corporate governance were in big remodel by increasing
shareholder engagement, expanding boards’ independent and rewarding through long-term equity
based incentives linked to share price performance, providing more flow of information from the
board which must be certified by outside gatekeepers, such as auditors and accountants. 197 This
reformation of corporate governance was triggered by the crisis and collapse of Enron sparked a
wide-ranging re-examination of corporate governance in the U.S. Enron (also happened to Tyco
International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WorldCom) exposed the fact that the various
elements of that time system were not functioning together. To begin with, the ground for this
reform is that shareholders failed to rationally value Enron because the Enron board failed to protect the integrity of financial disclosure.198 These board members also had high levels of relevant
competence, and were incentivized by stock options or other equity-based incentives. The executives of Enron were incentivized to adopt high-risk strategies oriented to earnings management
and propping up an overvalued stock in order to maintain the value of their stock options. Fur194
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thermore, gatekeepers such as the auditing firm of Arthur Anderson critically failed as an effective interface between management and investors.199 Finally, unlike situations were corporations
underperform, the market for corporate control provided little effective discipline or remedy for
the “over-valued” stock prices at Enron.200 This situation can be easily stated as executives were
stealing from the company.
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate
and accounting scandals. It created many changes on corporate governance which can be grouped
under three categories:201 audit-related changes, board-related changes, changes in disclosure and
accounting rules, and shareholder empowerment. This is a big overhaul in the U.S. corporate
governance system.
First, audit-related changes can be grouped into two major categories:
Conflict-reducing rules could be done by three methods:
(1) Limits on multiple roles and services by auditors as external auditors are prohibited
from providing certain kinds of non-audit services to their auditing clients. In practical terms, this
means they may not help clients choose, install, and operate accounting-related tasks.
(2) Shift the power to hire, fire and compensate the external auditors to the company’s
audit committee and require that all members of the audit committee must be “independent,” and
also gave the new definitions of independence are stricter than past.
(3) Reduction of interpersonal bonding between auditors and the audited by having a
mandatory periodic rotation of audit firms, and requiring that audit engagement partners and audit reviewing partners must be rotated off the engagement after five years.
Action-inducing rules can be done by four methods:
(1) Required internal control processes by requiring attestations about the effectiveness of
internal accounting controls. Under the new regime, public companies must have a system of
internal controls, management must make disclosures and attestations about the internal controls,
and the external auditors must also test and evaluate the system.
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(2) Certification of financial reports by requiring the SEC to adopt rules requiring principal executive officers and principal financial officers of reporting companies to certify quarterly
and annual reports. Specifically, these officers must now verify that they have actually reviewed
the report.
(3) Requiring financial literacy and financial expertise on audit committees for increasing
the chance that the committees will monitor well and effectively.
(4) Introducing new and independent auditing regulatory body called the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the function of which is to oversee and regulate external
auditing firms and their auditing processes.
Second, board-related changes may be grouped into two categories:
Providing conflict-reducing standards as exchanges require higher standard for listing
public companies to have a majority of independent directors on their boards (with an exception
for controlled companies) with stricter definitions of independence. In addition, the key committees which are audit, compensation, and nominating committee can contain only independent
directors. Then, increasing action-inducing standards for directors to act diligently by providing
feedback of performance to them. Furthermore, require all members of audit committees to be
financially literate. Last but not least, require boards to adopt and disclose both “corporate governance guidelines” and “a code of business conduct and ethics” and also require boards to engage formally in periodic self-assessments and evaluations.
Third, disclosure enhancements and accounting rule changes; this involves financial disclosures to shareholders and other public investors. The underlying premise is that better information enables investors to use their powers more effectively. The disclosure rules will be added
new duties and liabilities for agents and gatekeepers.
The details can be summarized as:
(1) Off-balance-sheet arrangements by requires public companies to disclose more about
special purpose entities and off-balance-sheet arrangements.
(2) Critical accounting policies by forcing public companies to identify and discuss their
“critical accounting policies” in their annual form 10-K reports (which are filed with the SEC and
available online to the public).
(3) Related party transactions are obstructed by requires public companies to disclose
more, and more about, related party transactions. The premise is that such transactions might be
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unfair to the company and its shareholders, and public disclosure may discourage unfairness or
facilitate remedial action.
(4) Accelerated filing requirements by mandates accelerated filing requirements for public
companies.
(5) Expensing stock options by requires listed companies to expense stock options and
disclose that information to public.
Fourth, shareholder empowerment; the best illustration of this point is the proposed SEC
rule to allow shareholder nomination of directors under certain conditions. More precisely, the
rule would allow shareholders meeting the requirements to put alternative nominees on the company’s proxy statement, which is distributed to all of its shareholders at the company’s expense,
and thus save these shareholders from the high cost of preparing and distributing their own proxy
materials. Another example of an atmospherically facilitated governance change is the shift from
classified boards to annual election of all directors at an increasing number of companies are following this.
Nevertheless, SOX produced changes in corporate governance standards applicable to
U.S. corporation governance but it did not come all at once, or from one standard-setting source,
but in related waves.202 Beginning with the federal level which enacted sweeping governance
changes and called for the SEC to adopt implementing rules and procedures on various topics.
Then follow by the new listing requirements for publicly traded companies governed by the exchanges that impose new corporate governance rules, for instance, the New York Stock Exchange
CG Rule. Next, the growth in influence of increasingly detailed and stringent corporate governance rating systems devised by private rating agencies and proxy advisers. Finally, an apparent
change in the tone and emphasis of judicial opinions, at least in important courts of Delaware
made corporate governance in the U.S. tangible and robust.
e) The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 which major roots of problem are rapid
growth of credit extension (including for residential mortgages) with deteriorating credit standards, financial product innovation, leverage of financial institutions, and flaws of securitized
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credit intermediation.203 Congress passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). Even though, most of the provisions deal with financial regulation but
some provisions, however, also impose new corporate governance regulations to all public corporations.204
We can conclude that the failure of conventional corporate governance can be divided into three categories which consist of:205
1. Formalism of corporate governance: the last era has developed in the direction of a relatively formalistic system of independence requirements for members of the board of directors
and its committees, as well as under the SOX. All of these requirements illustrate primarily driven by events such as Enron and WorldCom, where integrity was perceived to be at the center of
the problems.
2. Structure and process rather than content: the last era focus on structure and process,
the content of risk management and control activities as well as the experience of board members
may arguably not have received the attention they would have deserved.
3. Corporate governance as a co-sponsor of the crisis: As the boards of directors had led
into the crisis with independent rather than experienced board members. For their risk management efforts, they will have emphasized structure and process of the controls, rather than trying to
understand the substance of the risk.
The aforesaid reasons have leaded to the amendment of provisions to the U.S. corporate
governance circle.206
First, the “say on pay” mandate which requires periodic shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation. To be more precise, this provision forces reporting companies must conduct a shareholder advisory vote on specified executive compensation not less frequently than
every three years. At least once every six years, shareholders must vote on how frequently to hold
such an advisory vote. In addition, a shareholder advisory vote is required with respect to golden
parachutes. The vote must be tabulated and disclosed, but is not binding on the board of directors.
203
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Second, the compensation committees of reporting companies must be fully independent
and that those committees be given certain specified oversight responsibilities.
Third, the SEC require companies to provide additional disclosures with respect to executive compensation. By each reporting company’s annual proxy statement must contain a clear
exposition of the relationship between executive compensation and the issuer’s financial performance. The disclosure must give investors an easy way of comparing executive compensation
and firm performance over time. The proxy statement also must disclose whether employees are
allowed to hedge the value of company stock they own.
Fourth, expands SOX’s rules regarding clawbacks of executive compensation. In the
event a corporation is obliged to restate its financial statements due to “misconduct,” the CEO
and CFO must return to the corporation any bonus, incentive, or equity-based compensation they
received during the 12 months following the original issuance of the restated financials, along
with any profits they realized from the sale of corporate stock during that period. Dodd-Frank
significantly expands this provision by direct the self-regulatory organizations to require their
listed companies to disclose company policies for clawing back incentive-based compensation
paid to current or former executive officers in the event of a restatement of the company’s financials due to material non-compliance with any federal securities law financial reporting requirement. Issuers failing to adopt such a policy must be delisted.
Fifth, affirms that the SEC has authority to promulgate a so-called “shareholder access”
rule pursuant to which shareholders would be allowed to use the company’s proxy statement to
nominate candidates to the board of directors.
Sixth, requires that companies disclose whether the same person holds both the CEO and
Chairman of the Board positions and why they either do or do not do so.
Seventh, affords small issuers an exemption from the internal controls auditor attestation
requirement of the SOX. By permanently exempted non-accelerated filers from compliance with
the auditor attestation requirement.
Eighth, provides whistleblower protections207 by expanding the SOX’s provision to additional employees and also apply this provision to non-publicly traded subsidiaries of publicly
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traded companies. Moreover, including new strong monetary incentives provided to employees to
report compliance issues to the regulators.
Hence, Dodd-Frank marks an important expansion of the federal role in regulating corporate governance. The new provisions will have important consequences for all publicly traded
corporations and it tends to prevent upcoming cries as well.
4.

The Idea behind Federal Statute
Side-by-side with state law, federal statute also plays an important role for driving corpo-

rate governance in the U.S. After the realm of “deregulation policy”,208 the “cost-benefit analysis
standard” is used to evaluate financial regulation again.209 Most of the literature on corporate
governance has involved with this theory which has focused on explaining the relationship between the activities of a corporation and its governance structure. 210 Federal statutes supplement
state law principally by increasing the protection of shareholders.211 But, traditionally, federal law
has not supplanted the shareholder-director relationship as determined by the states. It is a prime
example of “the federalism.”212
In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays an important role under the securities law to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. The laws and regulations that govern the securities industry in the U.S.
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it,
and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge
for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security.
Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people
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make sound investment decisions.213 These disclosure requirements for protection of shareholders originally designed base on “the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis” (EMCH). A realistic
appraisal of the implications of the ECMH for securities regulatory policy must be made in light
of the stated purposes of the regulation. While the legislative histories of the securities law do not
articulate clearly the original purposes, one purpose of the legislation was to improve the economic functioning of the capital markets to achieve better resource allocation. The SEC, however, has come to perceive the primary purpose of the securities laws to be the protection of investors, rather than improved resource allocation. In implementing this protective purpose of the
securities legislation, the SEC implicitly has based its regulation on an idealized model of the
informed layperson making investment decisions in a market populated by equally informed investors. The SEC believes that it can best protect investors by making certain that all investors
trade on the basis of equal information, which has led to a conclusion that the dominant theme of
the securities laws is in fact "market egalitarianism."214 To achieve such market egalitarianism,
and to make the informed layperson model a reality, the SEC has attempted to direct the flow of
useful information so that it is equally available to and comprehensible by all investors. Thereby,
the ECMH should be regarded as a vital economic tool for shaping regulation of the securities
markets.
Moreover, the theory of “behavioral finance” is also being used concurrently with the
measures of mandated information disclosure and regulation of insider trading. This theory involves with “behavioral decision theory” that emerged from cognitive psychology’s study of human thought processes that raised substantial doubts about rational choice theory while noise
theory emerged from financial economists who applied those insights to capital market phenomena. The result is behavioral finance, a marriage of cognitive psychology and the financial economics of market inefficiency.215 It starts with a proposal to promote and expand investor education concerning the cognitive biases behavioral finance exposes. It proceeds to introduce and
propose reforms in three critical areas of law and policy that this model impacts: First, the market
regulatory environment in which investors participate, including suitability and churning rules
213
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and policies relating to day trading, margin trading, and circuit breakers; Second, the legal duties
of boards of directors in making capital allocation decisions such as equity offerings, dividend
distributions and stock acquisitions; and finally, issues in corporate and securities litigation, principally the reliance requirement in securities fraud cases and the stock market exception to the
appraisal remedy in cash out mergers. The insights of behavioral finance will be useful as a tool
in evaluating a whole range of existing and potential future legal and policy positions in corporate
and securities law.216 Nevertheless, federal statutes also have developed other measures apart
from these two theory, but the core principles still focus on them.
5.

Conclusion
The development of corporate law and financial regulation is based on two propelling en-

gines which are the legal norms and the external factors which influenced such norms. Legal theories, surrounding situations, past dilemmas, and unique legal structure are among those external
factors. In detail, the most prominent factors are the shareholder primacy regime, the dispersed
share ownership structure, the mandatory disclosure regime, and the competition between states.
It is totally clear to mention that the corporate governance regime in the U.S. is mostly based on
the relationship between shareholders and the board of director so this generic conflicts may usefully be characterized as the ‘agency problems.’ Therefore, corporate governance plays an important role to solve this problem by structuring through which the objectives of the company are
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.
Good corporate governance will provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and also facilitate effective monitoring. Though, the characteristic of the corporate governance in the U.S. tends primarily to fix past dilemmas and seal up former loop-holes but I believe that the structures and
provisions that had established will also prevent the forthcoming cries as well. Since, the structures and provisions seems to be circumspectly tailored to make the system to be a lot more protective. Therefore, corporate governance is unlikely to become moribund from a policy or intellectual perspective.217 The role of corporation itself emphasizes the importance of corporate gov-
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ernance. If corporation is similar to the bare bone of our body, then corporate governance is similar to flesh and blood which cover and fulfill those bare bone.
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D.

Comparative Part

I.

Legal Practice of Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany
Since the 1990s there is an ongoing corporate governance movement.218 Particularly in

the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 stronger efforts were made in analyzing weak points
of management behaviors against the background of their corporate governance and compliance
system. In this context, comparative aspects are under special observation indicating the success
or failure of the predominant corporate governance system in each jurisdiction.
This following section shall compare and analyze the manner in which corporate governance is made concentrating on important differences between the U.S. and Germany. Special attention is given to the question of harmonization of the corporate governance systems, reasons
for this and future prospects.
1.

How Corporate Governance Is Made in the US
In the U.S., concisely, there are two main sources of corporate governance which are state

law and federal statutes. For state law, the most distinct one among fifty states is Delaware law
which both excellent in judiciary and court of justice. The Delaware judiciary is a leader in
stamping its early approval on many new legal innovation and emerging best practices relating to
corporate governance in Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Along with, the Delaware
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court are also play a crucial role in making precedent on corporate governance matters.219 American common law concerned corporate governance
is unique since it blends both code of corporation law- DGCL- and judge-made-law together.
However, Delaware law has only a marginal impact on changes affecting key corporate governance topics such as executive pay and shareholder activism. On the other hand, its role still considerable with board of directors’ related problem, for instance, a series of well-known Delaware
court decisions in the mid-1980s fortified the status of independent directors and provided incentives for boards to be attentive. Also, Delaware court rulings helped to bring to an end the hectic
takeover activity of the 1980s. In addition, the federal securities law and regulations, which fundamentally based on disclosure regime, also brings about significant change in corporate governance. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who plays leading role on the topic, first
218
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brought corporate governance on to the official reform agenda in the mid-1970s. Next, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which Congress enacted in response to high-profile corporate
scandals involving companies, contained numerous provisions relevant to corporate governance.
Then, The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, despite focusing primarily on the regulation of banks, contained a sub-title entitled “Strengthening Corporate Governance” applicable to all issuers falling
under the SEC’s jurisdiction.220 Last but not least, Private actors such as the stock exchanges also
set corporate governance requirements in their listing rule and institutional shareholders also lobby for corporate governance changes as they have enough bargaining economic power as well.
This is a summary of how corporate governance in the U.S. has been made.
2.

How Corporate Governance Is Made in Germany
Corporative governance discusses the question of good and thoroughly leadership and su-

pervision of companies. This is nothing new to German law since questions concerning supervision and leadership traditionally were much discussed in regard of revisions of the AktG and led
to an own chapter in the AktG.221 However, Germany entered the discussions about corporate
governance decades after they first arose in the US.
Traditionally, corporate governance was governed by laws in most jurisdictions. In the
course of time, laws became inflexible due to their long process of developing and being passed,
wherefore the role of self-regulation grew.222 Against this background, corporate governance of
other forms, such as soft law or other expressions have gained ground. The idea of this is to not
corset companies into inflexible structures and enable to react flexibly to the market developments.223 Germany, like many other countries adopted a code and thereby followed the example
of the United Kingdom.224
In the light of German law-making, this process was far from evident. Historically, Germany is known for it’s traditional and rather complex legal system. 225 As a country with a codebased jurisdiction226, the largest parts of law were ruled in extensive codifications, for more than
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a century, that were passed more than 100 years ago. New laws must have been enacted by the
German Bundestag and had to pass lengthy processes until coming into force. 227 However, with
the international forces, the market, the globalization and internationalization,228 the process of
deregulation inserted and the role of national laws is slowly decreasing.
The DCGK, as most other corporate governance codes, contains mostly recommendations
as to how to ensure good corporate governance directed to noted companies. The code itself does
not have any legal force, however, legal force is indirectly attained by section 161 of the AktG.
The “comply or explain” principle of section 161 AktG is the obligation of noted companies to
add a declaration of conformity related to the DCGK in their annual report, naming those recommendations that were not followed.229 The idea is to link the code to a legally binding provision and thereby forcing reactions regarding the companies.
In Germany, a country of a long tradition and history concerning codifications, critics
were loud, since the code was established by a non-parliamentary body and the criticism went
against the idea of “recommendations”.230 In the light of constitutional law the justification of
binding forces which were made by informal or private bodies of law, instead of the known legislative process was rather complex. 231 Until now German constitutional lawyer claim that the recommendations are on some level forcing companies without no parliamentary background, which
cannot hold in the light of democracy and parliamentary legislature. 232 These criticism is true:
adherence of the company is high and the companies might react out of the fear to be punished by
the market, since the adherence with the code is an important information for foreign investors
and influences in the decision of investing in those companies. However, this regulation mechanism233 proved.
However, the German approach of law-making still shows influences of its code-based
mentality. It appears that the government tends to turn soft law into binding law if the recommendations or suggestions were not sufficiently followed. The German Management Compensation Disclosure Act (Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung, hereafter referred to
227
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as “VorstOG”)234 serves as an example for this. Firstly, the idea that individualized compensation
figures should be disclosed, was made in the form of a mere suggestion in the DCGK.235 15
months later the DCGK in its version of 2003 changed the same idea to a recommendation,
meaning that, boards must follow the “comply or explain” principle and were thereby set under
more pressure due to an actual obligation to comply236. Since the government was of the opinion
that even the recommendations did not lead to the expected extent of transparency and disclosure
it turned the idea into binding law with the VorstOG.237
3.

The shareholder approach in the context of US law principles
In the U.S., from my aspect, there are three major factors which formed corporate govern-

ance to the way it is. They are shareholders primacy regime, dispersed share ownership, and
mandatory disclosure regime. Although, these factors play a significant role in shaping the U.S.
corporate governance but they also cause dilemma through times. There are a lot of issues follow
these factors which by the way can both consider as a good archetype for other countries and as a
unique obstacle for the U.S. socioeconomic. We are going to take a closer look on them.
a) Shareholders Primacy Regime
It is a norm in the U.S. corporate law that the goal of corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.238 We can call this a dominance of a
shareholder-centered ideology. The foundation of the shareholder primacy norm is found in the
directors’ fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders. 239 In
addition, it is also strengthened by the business judgment rule. Regardless of how stupid, egregious or irrational a board decision may be that destroys, rather than maximizes, shareholder
wealth, it provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.240 In particular, it is hard to say that the U.S. corporate law tends to increase social welfare
234
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and asserting that this means furthering the interests of shareholders. 241 According to the U.S.
corporate law, corporation, especially public corporation, is solely privilege shareholder interests
over those of other constituencies such as creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, or even the
interests of the society as a whole. This is not because we believe that shareholder ownership of
corporations is an indisputable and sacred property right. Rather, it is because of three reasons.242
First, the firm’s residual claimants cannot be adequately protected by contract. Then, to protect
their interests, they must be given the right to control the firm. Second, if the control rights granted to the firm’s equity holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives to
maximize the value of the firm. And a third reason is that the interests of participants in the firm
other than shareholders can generally be adequately protected by contract and regulation, so that
maximization of the firm’s value by its shareholders complements the interests of those other
participants rather than competing with them. The shareholder-oriented model does more than
assert the primacy of shareholder interests, however. It asserts the interests of all shareholders,
including minority shareholders. More importantly, it is a central tenet in the standard model that
minority or non-controlling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the
hands of controlling shareholders.243 In publicly-traded firms, this means that all shareholders
should be assured an essentially equal claim on corporate earnings and assets.
The objective of maximizing shareholder welfare runs deeply through the relevant statutory and case law that it is rarely questioned, except when the conflict between the interests of
shareholders and those of other corporate constituencies grows too acute. In general, there are
three principal sources of conflicts in corporation which are conflict between agents and shareholders, conflict among shareholders, and conflict between shareholders and the corporation’s
other constituencies, for instance, creditors, employees. Among a large number of cases in the
U.S., the most mentioned conflict is the conflict between agents and shareholders which can be
characterized as the ‘agency problems’.244 It is totally clear to mention that the corporate governance regime in the U.S. is mostly based on the relationship between shareholders and the board of
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directors since directors tend to alter the way the shareholder primacy primarily should be by turn
the benefit more for themselves. It can be concluded that the core idea of the U.S. corporate governance is to balance the shareholders’ primacy with the board of director’s discretion on using
business judgement. Besides, once shareholder welfare is identified as the principal objective of
corporate law and there are only two main ways that shareholders can profit from a corporation:
by receiving distributions of the company’s profits and by selling all or part of their interest in the
corporation. It follows easily that economic efficiency is the logical criterion for evaluating corporate law. Any factor that increases residual value of the firm to its shareholders is efficient by
the criterion.245
The U.S. corporate governance has also developed various tools, for instance, the employee stock option plan (ESOP) and the stock option for firm’s directors, for distributing the
benefits of firm’s growth to the workforce and executive. This affirms that the U.S. model also
care of stakeholders but instead of paying money or offering benefits directly, we turn them to
shareholders which will add more incentive to improved productivity and increased profits for the
corporation. At the end this will help build a better society.
In my opinion, the U.S. system is flexible, as managers with broad discretion may more
easily respond to changed external circumstances. After balancing the outcome with shareholders
primacy, this can make corporation’s growth rapidly increases. On the other hand, managerial
insulation may be the cause of the system’s instability and the recurrence of large scandals in
another way apart from shareholders’ interest.246 The absence of shareholder influence on these
problems implies that the conflict with stakeholders are relatively insignificant from the view of
the U.S. corporate governance.
b) Dispersed Share Ownership
The nature and number of corporate shareholders surely leave a mark on the structure of
corporate law. In the U.S., there are large numbers of publicly-traded corporations that have dispersed share ownership, such that no single shareholder, or affiliated group of shareholders, is
capable of exercising control over the firm. Though, the evolution of capital market drives innovation in corporate governance forward, so focusing solely between the relationship of dispersed
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shareholders and directors of large public firms might become obsolete. Since the supervisory
role on the executives has shifted to an institutional investor.247 As a result, now the ownership
and control of corporation are separated as old-day shareholders have turned to be just beneficial
owners for receiving only benefits, for instance, dividend and other interests, and institutional
investors, as a record owner, play an important role of representing beneficial owner and monitoring corporate’s executives. This shift of equity ownership from a widely distributed ownership
to concentrated institutional ownership gave rise to “agency capitalism” era, as approximately
owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations. 248 In
the light of the aforesaid situation, it can vividly state that the “agency capitalism”, which in turn
leads to the problem of separation of ownership from control, has a major impact on modern corporate governance in the U.S.
As an aftermath, institution investors should play a significant role as the shareholder activists but the only concern is the passivity role of them. In other words, institution investors very
rarely get involve with the matter on corporate governance of their stock-holding corporations.
Institution investors, consist of mutual fund and pension fund, do not run a role of shareholder
activists willingly for reasons, for instance, the cost of agency, the worthiness of benefit to overall portfolio, the lacking of experience or internal mechanism, the lacking of incentive for fund
managers, and last but not least, the need of focusing on macro view than micro view. 249 On the
other hand, hedge fund and proxy advisory firm can act as an activist shareholders by working
hand–in-hand with pension fund and mutual fund. Since they are not pursuit of private benefits of
control, specialize in monitoring companies to identify strategic opportunities and can then persuade their enthusiastic solution to pension fund and mutual fund for their approval. 250 In return,
the activist can be compensate by the quality of their work. This process can bring balance between large firms’ executives and beneficial owners, though, this model seems to be more practical than the old-day which minority shareholders needed to gather their votes together, because
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institution investors already held a majority sum of large firm shares. But institution investors
must be free of conflict of interest and be professional in proxy voting services.251
In my opinion, despite the fact that nowadays institutional investors play a crucial role in
the U.S. corporate governance system, but they still act as only a record holder for individual
investors. In other words, the dispersed share ownership structure in the U.S. still remains. So in
the end, the beneficiary shareholders behind those institutional investors still exists but their right
tends to be more efficiently protected by the activist institutions. As a result, in substance, public
firms in the U.S. are not belong to specific group of people, but instead indirectly held for benefit
by dispersed group of people. Then we may summarize that because of our disperse shareholder
structure, we do not need to care for stakeholder’s value that much as shareholders in the U.S.
can well represent stakeholders in the society.
c) Mandatory disclosure regime
The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation has been
the subject of a longstanding debate in the field of corporate governance in the U.S. The debate
has largely focused on the desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in the U.S., a country characterized by dispersed ownership structures. This requirement aims to protect investors by
creating equality among them. The presence of a demanding disclosure regime would have the
socially desirable effect of increasing competition in the capital and product markets and also
providing investors information which directly relate to their decision to buy or sell securities. 252
Disclosure obligations are imposed on the issuer, a nonparty to the transaction, to protect the parties’ investment decisions. The duties owed in that setting are not unlike traditional corporate law
duties, albeit usually imposed on the directors rather than the corporation to protect other shareholder decisions. It is undeniable that the mandatory disclosure regime is the core of securities
regulation in the U.S. and can be stated that it is a core policy for securities regulation all over the
world. On the other hand, the duty to disclose firms’ information also be a great cost for firms as
well so one of the most important agenda for the policy maker and/or regulator is to balance the
mandatory disclosure regime by caring on both the investors’ benefit and the firm’s management
and operation cost.
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This disclosure regime at first glance seems market-based, rather than governance-based.
Such a market/governance distinction has been attractive to some who advocated federal preemption of the regulation of market transactions. Yet, any clear division between corporate governance and regulation of market transactions has blurred to such an extent that the line seems difficult to preserve. Modern financial theory recognizes the direct link between market rules and
governance rules, in which the existence of market constraints can reduce the need for legal rules
of governance. One of the most obvious example in the U.S. is the rise of the reporting on the
presence of conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in their supply
chains. Beginning May 31, 2014, publicly traded companies will be required to declare to the
SEC whether or not their products or components contain tin, tungsten, tantalum or gold which
can be abbreviated as “3TG” materials, since this issue relates to human rights abuses in the
DRC. Many businesses have been dragging their feet on preparations for complying. Many have
yet to create a reporting structure with their suppliers, contract manufacturers and other supplychain partners because minerals covered by the rule are found in countless consumer goods, including electronics products, automobiles, packaging and medical devices. Given that the average
public company works with between 2,000 and 10,000 first-tier suppliers, and many thousands
more further up the supply chain, the task of tracing product content all the way back to the mine
is a daunting one.253 As a result, the cost of compliance promises to be huge.
In my opinion, the conflict-minerals rule probably won’t be the last time that regulators
seek control over the human-rights policies of global business. It could conceivably be extended
to other parts of the world, or additional raw materials. Then we need to rethink about the policy
behind the mandatory disclosure regime in the U.S. The question is, the U.S. is going to expand
types of information that firms need to disclosure to the public. In other words, the role of the
disclosure regime in the U.S. is going to be broader. We are about to cross the line of the goal of
protecting shareholders right for investing to the new area of international agendas. On the other
hand, the cost of disclosure still be an important issue to consider about. By the way, this demonstrates that the border of the mandatory disclosure regime is gradually getting broader and broader.
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4.

The stakeholder approach
Germany, as most European countries, follows the stakeholder approach. According to

the stakeholder approach, the focus of corporate governance is not only the maximization of
shareholder wealth, but broader, involving also the interest of other groups of stakeholders.254 By
common understanding stakeholders can be of all groups of natural persons and institutions that
transact with the company and have economic interest as to what happens in the company, such
as customers, creditors or suppliers.255 Main interest for the stakeholder is the compensation of
contributions made for the company. Employees are stakeholders as well. If a company promises
a new workplace in another city and the employee in reliance upon this information moves to that
other city only to be told that the company cannot hire due to economic struggles, the employee
is directly affected by the happening of that company.256
Employees, however, enjoy a special role in German corporate law. As in many other European countries there is mandatory labor codetermination. Whereas in most other states labor
usually represents a third of board membership, German corporate law mandates shareholder and
labor membership at parity on the supervisory board. Against this background, Labor codetermination might be one of the most intense expressions of the stakeholder approach in corporate
governance.
In the U.S., the idea of “stakeholder theory” starts with “corporate philanthropy” 257 which
is the act of a corporation or business promoting the welfare of others, generally via charitable
donations of fund, product, service or time. The best example is the Microsoft Corporation258
donates a lot of software to nonprofits around the world. Then the idea developed to “corporate
social responsibility” (CSR)259 in a form of corporate self-regulation integrated into a business
model. CSR policy functions as a self-regulatory mechanism whereby a business monitors and
ensures its active compliance with the spirit of the law, ethical standards and national or interna-
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tional norms. U.S. businesses freely acknowledge their ethical and social obligations. They accept the idea that businesses bear economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities. After that, the U.S. has developed the concept of “stakeholder theory” further to “benefit corporation” (B-Corp). In the U.S., B-Corp is a type of for-profit corporate entity, authorized by more
than half of all states in the U.S. that includes positive impact on society and the environment in
addition to profit as its legally defined goals. B-Corp differ from traditional corporations only in
purpose, accountability, and transparency, but not in taxation and board of directors’ fiduciary
duty. To be a B-Corp, the charter of incorporation must contain the charter provision that comply
with the purpose of B-Corp. On August 2013, Delaware’s new benefit corporation law came into
effect, making Delaware the 19th state to authorize the formation of benefit corporations. B-Corp
a special type of corporation that requires directors to consider the advancement of certain specified public benefits when making management decisions for the company. 260 Delaware’s adoption of the B-Corp model is significant, because Delaware has historically been a leader in American corporate law. The purpose of a benefit corporation includes creating general public benefit,
which is defined as a material positive impact on society and the environment. A benefit corporation’s directors and officers operate the business with the same authority as in a traditional corporation but are required to consider the impact of their decisions not only on shareholders but also
on society and the environment. Transparency provisions require B-Corp to publish annual benefit reports of their social and environmental performance using a comprehensive, credible, independent, and transparent third-party standard.261 The major concern in the U.S. is on the difficulty
of raising capital of the B-Corp because of charitable function. This in turn might disincentives
profit- making institution investors from investing but will work for long-term investors.
II.

Harmonization

1.

On a global level
Since the mid-twentieth century, global rule making has been increasingly the province of

“international organization”. Institutions defined by academics as grounded in a formal ratified
treaty and enjoying “state membership, tangible manifestations of organizational bureaucracy,
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and an adequate legal pedigree.”262 By contrast, in the international financial system, the production of international standards and rules arises through largely information institutional arrangements grounded in nonbinding bylaws, charters, and accords which, as such, aren’t recognized
under international law263 and they can be introduced as “soft law”. These soft law have been set
by the group of “G-20” which contains both the U.S. and Germany. Although, the commitments
made by international financial organizations have no legal effect and are unrecognized and nonbinding as a matter of international law, but they can still be enforced in international forum.
Since international financial rules and standards are adopted robustly across borders, regulators
are better able to ensure adequate cross-border supervision of market participants, no matter
where they operate. Opportunities for arbitrage and regulatory competition are dramatically reduced, and enforcement cooperation and information sharing among jurisdictions is enhanced.264
These are the incentive of complying with soft law. On the other hand, if a regulator deems certain rules disadvantageous to its domestic markets, it may fail to honor its commitments. Since
the international financial regulation, though formally a species of “soft law,” is bolstered by various disciplining mechanisms that render it, under circumstances, more coercive than traditional
theories of international law predict. For instance, the loss of reputation and ability to create coalitions and alliances in the future, the cost of capital for firms operating in noncompliant jurisdictions will increase and also be banned from international fund raising transaction as well.265
Soft law instruments can be grouped into three broad categories266:
(1) Best practices: International financial law often takes the form of best practices to
promote sound regulatory provisions. They tend to define the minimum shared standards necessary for a good financial regulatory system.
(2) Regulatory reports and observations: They are acknowledged as the data collected, assessed, and utilized by national and international regulators to craft policy. They are another important source of international financial law. Reports create an official record of fact and help
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establish a basis for policymaking and often generate normative undercurrents that help define
the appropriateness of different regulatory responses. Furthermore, help establish tacit commitments by national authorities
(3) Information sharing and enforcement cooperation: Many international financial
agreements spell out procedural means by which greater information sharing and enforcement
cooperation can be achieved. Information-sharing agreements are usually promulgated through
memorandum of understanding (MOU) and address the reality that many domestic financial institutions are globally active. They help coordination with other international regulators. Moreover,
enforcement agreements, detail the terms by which different countries agree to provide assistance
to one another for enforcing domestic or international rules.
In the field of corporate governance, there are two major organizations which set an international standard for corporate governance. They are Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) and International Organization for Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
To begin with, OECD267 has three main aims; first to promote policies designed to
achieve sustainable economic growth in member countries while maintaining financial stability;
contribute to sound economic expansion in member/non-member countries in process of economic development; and to contribute to the expansion of world trade. The main role of OECD is to
develop standards and guidelines for countries to devise or retain effective corporate governance
frameworks. This has formed the basis of the corporate governance component of the world.
Though, membership stands at only 31 countries but has informal relationships with 71 nonmembers. Despite exclusive membership requirements, defines itself as a forum for governments
to compare policies, seek answers to common problems, and identify good practices.
Second, IOSCO268 has duty as a standard setter for securities regulation. From historical
view, it is tied to the rapid internationalization growth of securities markets. Its membership expanded to include not only the U.S. but also many countries around the world. It adopted a more
aggressive means of facilitating enforcement cooperation through its multilateral memorandum
of understanding (MMOU), an agreement memorializing a process whereby regulators can ask
assistance from their foreign counterparts to help prosecute cases in which witnesses or the pro-
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ceeds of fraud are located in other jurisdictions. In exchange of that they need to follow the
standard that IOSCO has set and one of the most important standard is the standard for disclosure
of information of the publicly traded corporation.
2.

On EU level
Europe is a continent with rich, various and different traditions in all its member states. In

terms of the prevailing law, the economic, social and cultural aspects and conditions lead to pathdependent developments in different directions.269 However, with the establishment of the European Union in 1993, the focus was laid on creating a single European airspace and guarantee the
fundamental freedoms. A united European Union aimed on a European community in order to
become stronger and to be able to face big competitors east of Germany as well as overseas. Furthermore, the market itself contributed to national legislators to internationally compare and analyze their national system in order to find weak points and eliminate them.270 The need for harmonization, therefore, is a result of many independently acting forces, such as the market and the
intent to stay competitive as well as the idea behind the European Union.
In regard to corporate law, the European legislator planned to create uniform and harmonized conditions and options for entrepreneurs in conformity with the EU domestic market. 271 For
this, the European legislator has different instruments.
a) Approximation of national corporate laws
Directives are the main force for the approximation of the national corporate laws and are directed to the national legislators. They are based on article 50 II g) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, hereafter
referred to as “AEUV”). Directives, however, are not directly legally binding but attain normative force after being transferred by the national laws of each country.
An example for this was the council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 directing
legislators of all member states to create rules to implement the SE into their national law. Germany did so by passing the European Company Implementation Act.272
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b) New supranational legal forms
In the same context, harmonization is encouraged by the creation of new legal forms on a
supranational level. The SE is the most known supranational legal form in corporate law. Supranational legal forms such as the SE step beside national options of corporations and provide
companies another choice, encouraged by the EU. Being ruled entirely by the law of the European Union choosing this legal form promises maximal legal certainty and attains attractiveness
thereby. Moreover, the SE offers a simplified possibility to act transnational and furthermore
promotes transnational mergers of companies from the member states.
c) Control by the EuGH
The decisions of the EuGH regarding the freedom of establishment have shown the scope
of power, that the EuGH has with its ruling. With overruling existing schools of thoughts, as it
did by deciding against the seat-theory, it can change the legal direction of all member states,
obliging them to follow. In its decisions the EuGH explicitly accepts companies to take advantage of other member states’ more preferable corporate laws, thereby promoting flexibility
among companies in the member states. Against the background of harmonization, the EuGH
plays an important role by diffusing and standardizing across national borders. 273
III.

Conclusion
Corporate Governance is an issue that was first raised in the U.S. Only decades later it ar-

rived Europa via the United Kingdom and reached Germany.274 International competition forced
the European counties to catch up in order to compete. In this context, the predominant jurisdictions are experiencing a “regulatory competition”275 to convince and attract investors and companies. However, approaches are different. Responsible for this are the differences in the background of both jurisdiction being economical, historical and political differences.
Disparities grew since both countries approached opposing theories. The U.S. strongly believe in the shareholders primacy regime but Germany chose to follow the path of stakeholder
benefit. However, at present, it seems that either the U.S. or Germany views’ on corporate gov-
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ernance tend to be in harmony with each other. There are many evidences affirmed this assumption as we both have illustrated in this part of this report. This might be the dawn of the stakeholder welfare’s protection, instead of shareholder’s benefit maximization. Furthermore, we are
confident that in the near future the harmonization will be seen much clearer because of the impact of the business globalization. To be more precise, the unification of nations and the drive of
international trade and investment will make corporation law’s structure resemble.
Although the trend follows the idea of harmonization, one should not forget, that developments in terms of corporate governance are deeply linked to the crises and driven by corporate
scandals of the individual jurisdiction.276 These problems, however, are not necessarily identical
across borders. For this reason, corporate governance solutions of other countries not be simply
copied and implemented into another jurisdiction of another background with the same success.277
Furthermore, the rise of soft law era will play a major role for harmonization of financial
regulation in every jurisdiction. As a result, corporate and financial lawyers around the world
need to adjust their legal thought on this change and be ready for the upcoming wave of globalization.
Summing up, the trend goes to the opening of both jurisdictions towards each other. 278
Despite the convergence, however, substantial differences prevail, which were products of the
individual development of the country and its history. 279
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